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Abstract 
 
This work is an answer to the EIOPA 2017 report. It follows from the latter that in order to assess the potential 
systemic risk we should take into account the build-up of risk and in particular the risk that arises in time, as well 
as the interlinkages in the financial sector and the whole economy.  
Our main tools used to analyse the systemic risk dynamics in the European insurance sector during the years 2005-
2019 are the topological indices of minimum spanning trees (MST) and the deltaCoVaR measure. 
We address the following questions: 
1) What is the contribution to systemic risk of each of the 28 largest European insurance companies whose list 
includes also those appearing on the G-SIIs list?  
2) Does the analysis of the deltaCoVaR of those 28 insurance companies and the conclusions we draw agree 
with the our claims from our latest article [Wanat S., Denkowska A. 2019]. In clear: does the most important 
contribution to systemic risk come from the companies that have the highest betweenness centrality or the 
highest degree in the MST obtained? 
 
Introduction 
 
The subject of this work is part of the current research on the interlinkages of large insurance 
companies and their contribution to systemic risk in the insurance sector. In international 
literature we find many studies related to the systemic risk analysis in the banking sector but 
little is done regarding systemic risk in the insurance sector. A novelty we bring to the literature 
is to identify the relationship between the contribution to systemic risk and the structure of the 
minimum spanning tree described by topological network indicators, which can be used in 
further research to construct models whose task is to predict the possibility of systemic risk. 
Our work constitutes an answer to the recommendations contained in the 2017 report of the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), an independent EU 
advisory body to the European Parliament, the Council of Europe and the European 
Commission, which shows that when analyzing systemic risk in the insurance sector, one 
should take into account, among others, the dynamics of interconnectedness between 
institutions. The present article is another study of the authors in this subject. In a previous 
paper [Wanat, Denkowska (2019)], selected topological indicators of Minimum Spanning Trees 
were analysed and interrelationships between major European insurance institutions were 
examined. 
The purpose of this work is to confront the contribution to the systemic risk of each of the 28 
insurance institutions analysed with the results of a previous study. We examine whether 
interlinkages between insurers, and thus the level of possibility of contagion with a potential 
crisis, is related to the creation of systemic risk by individual insurance companies. 
The global economic crisis on financial markets, the peak of which was in the years 2008-2009, 
initiated on the market of high-risk mortgage loans in the USA as a result, among others, of the 
deregulation of the financial market in 1999, when the ban on combining two types of banking: 
investment (high risk) and deposit-credit banking, which was in force since 1929 and was to 
protect citizens in the event of losses in investment banking, ceased to apply. On September 
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15th 2008 Lehman Brothers' – the fourth largest investment bank, after a fruitless attempt to 
obtain help from the US central bank, declared bankruptcy. A week earlier, the Fed took over 
two insurance and loan companies with huge debts: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The Fed and 
the Ministry of the Treasury have recapitalized the largest insurance and financial holding 
company AIG in the amount of USD 85bn, as the loss of liquidity and, consequently, its collapse 
would mean a rapid spread of the crisis. The American International Group (AIG) is the first 
example of an insurance company that required (and received) funding because it was 
considered systemically important. When dividing financial institutions into three groups 
according to their activity, i.e. investment, depository and risk-dissipating institutions, 
insurance companies should be in the third group. Therefore, they should not generate systemic 
risk as long as they deal with taking over, dispersing and redistributing the financial effects of 
risk. But if they take over credit risk, e.g. financial insurance, insurance guarantees, derivative 
trading, in particular like AIG Credit Default swap (CDS) involved in trading financial 
instruments given as collateral in case of default on repayment obligations, they generate 
systemic risk (see [William K. Sjostrum, Jr. (2009)]) 
After the subprime crisis, all financial supervising authorities drew attention to the need for 
macro-prudential policy, which would take into account the dynamics of structure changes and 
linkages between financial institutions. The situation of AIG in 2008 was surprising, when it 
was announced in February that in 2007 it achieved profits of USD 6.20 billion (USD 2.39 per 
share). The stock was closed on that day at USD 50.15 per share. Less than seven months later, 
the company was on the verge of bankruptcy and had to be funded by the US government. This 
is the first and very important event that indicates that the insurance sector plays a large role 
when assessing systemic risk. Therefore, in 2013 IAIS, when developing a method of 
identifying insurance institutions of particular importance for financial stability, takes into 
account the following five dimensions (see [Global Systemically ...., 2013]): 
• size of the insurance institution (5%), 
• range of global activity (5%), 
• assessment of the degree of direct and indirect linkages of the institution within the financial 
system (40%), 
• non-traditional and non-insurance activity of the insurer (45%), 
• product substitutability - the significance of the institution for the financial system increases 
along with the lack of real substitution possibilities for the services provided by the insurer 
(5%). 
In line with the IAIS recommendations, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) announced in 2016 
a list of systemically important insurers (G-SIIs): Aegon N.V., Allianz SE, American 
International Group, Inc. (AIG), Aviva plc, Axa S.A., MetLife, Inc., Ping An Insurance (Group) 
Company of China, Ltd., Prudential Financial, Inc., Prudential plc. 
 
Literature review 
 
Before the subprime (2007-2009) and excessive public debt in the euro area countries (2010-
2013) crises, there was a strong belief that the insurance market is systemically insignificant. 
In international literature that emerged as a consequence of the crisis, many studies have 
maintained their previous beliefs, but we also find numerous works confirming the possibility 
of the insurance sector creating systemic risk. Examples include works in which authors believe 
that insurance companies have become an unavoidable source of systemic risk (e.g. [Billio et 
al. 2012], [Weiß, Mühlnickel 2014]) and those in which they claim that they can be 
systematically significant , but this is due to their non-traditional (banking) activities (e.g. 
[Baluch et al. 2011], [Cummins, Weiss 2014]) and the overall systemic importance of the 
insurance sector as a whole is still subordinated to the banking sector ([Chen et al. 2013] ). In 
               A DYNAMIC MST- deltaCoVar MODEL OF SYSTEMIC RISK IN THE EUROPEAN 
INSURANCE SECTOR. 
3 
 
turn, in [Bierth in. 2015], the authors, after examining a very large sample of insurers in the 
long term, believe that the contribution of the insurance sector to systemic risk is relatively 
small, however, they claim that it reached its peak during the financial crisis in 2007-2008, 
which we also confirm in our analysis. Analysts also report that significant factors affecting the 
insurers' exposure to systemic risk are the strong linkages of large insurance companies, 
leverage, losses and liquidity (four L's). However, the complete lack of evidence of the systemic 
importance of the insurance industry is indicated, among others, by the following papers 
[Harrington 2009], [Bell, Keller 2009] and [Geneva Association 2010]. 
The problem of the insurance sector's ability to create systemic risk has also been the subject of 
consideration in Polish scientific literature in recent years. In general, as above, two main 
positions are represented. In [Czerwińska 2014], based on research of the insurance sector in 
European Union countries covering the period 2005-2012, it was found that along with the 
increase in the level of linkages between insurers and various financial system segments, mainly 
the capital market and the banking sector, the importance of insurance institutions for the 
stability of the entire system increases. In turn, in [Bedarczyk 2013], the author, assessing 
insurance institutions as a potential creator of systemic risk, concluded that dispersing and 
taking over insurance risk ultimately does not create systemic risk. It indicates a relatively low 
level of interconnectedness and draws attention to the fact that insurers are not highly dependent 
on external financing, so they should not be included in the group of systemically important 
institutions. At the same time, it was mentioned that insurers engaged in non-insurance 
activities pose a threat to the system by taking over credit risk. CoVaR (see e.g. [Acharya et al. 
2010], [Bierth et al. 2015], [Jobst 2014]).  Measures of the impact (contribution) of an 
individual financial institution on the systemic risk of a given market and measures of the 
institution's sensitivity to this risk are CoVaR and ∆CoVaR [Adrian, Brunnermeier 2011] 
 
Empirical strategy 
 
In order to identify the possible relationship linking the structure of the interconnections 
between insurance companies to the creation of systemic risk by these companies, we proceed 
in two steps. In the first one, we analyse the dynamics of the structure of interlinkages between 
insurers. For this purpose, we use the time series of the following selected topological network 
indicators (see Wang et al., 2014]): 
- Average Path Length (APL) 
- Maximum Degree - Max.Degree 
- parameters 𝛼 of the power distribution of vertex degrees: 𝑃(𝑠) = 𝐶 ∙ 𝑠−𝛼,  𝛼 > 0, 
- betweenness centrality (BC). 
The Average Path Length (APL) is defined as the average number of steps taken along all the 
shortest paths connecting all possible pairs of network nodes. 
The Maximum Degree: in graph theory it is defined as the maximal number of edges coming 
out from a vertex (where each loop counts for two). In other words, it measures the number of 
connections to the central vertex. 
The Betweenness Centrality (BC) measures the centrality of a vertex: we consider the ratio 
between the number of shortest paths connecting two vertices and passing through the given 
one, and the number of all the shortest paths between pairs of distinct vertices. It indicates thus 
the most important nodes of a network based on shortest paths (e.g. the most influential insurer). 
 
We obtain these series based on the determined minimum spanning trees  𝑀𝑆𝑇𝑡  for each period 
studied. We construct the 𝑀𝑆𝑇𝑡  trees using conditional correlations between each pair of 
analysed insurance companies determined using the copula-DCC-GARCH model. Details of 
the construction are presented in the work [Wanat S., Denkowska A.2019]. 
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In the second step, we examine the contribution of a single insurer to the systemic risk of the 
European insurance sector using the CoVaR delta model. In this model, the basis for measuring 
risk is the CoVaR measure. Formally, 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑗|𝑖𝛽,𝑡 is defined as the value at risk (VaR) of an 
institution j under the condition that another institution i is at risk of crisis in a given period t, 
i.e. its rate of return is less than its value at risk: 
  𝑃(𝑟𝑗,𝑡 ≤ 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅
𝑗|𝑖
𝛽,𝑡|𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ≤  𝑉𝑎𝑅
𝑖
𝛼,𝑡) =  𝛽 (1) 
Using the formula for the conditional probability we have: 
 
𝑃(𝑟𝑗,𝑡≤ 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅
𝑗|𝑖
𝛽,𝑡, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝑉𝑎𝑅
𝑖
𝛼,𝑡)
𝑃(𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝑉𝑎𝑅
𝑖
𝛼,𝑡)
=  𝛽 (2) 
In addition, the definition of value-at-risk for institutions and implies that 
 𝑃(𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝑉𝑎𝑅
𝑖
𝛼,𝑡) = 𝛼 (3) 
From equations (2) and (3) we get: 
 𝑃(𝑟𝑗,𝑡 ≤ 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅
𝑗|𝑖
𝛽,𝑡,𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ≤  𝑉𝑎𝑅
𝑖
𝛼,𝑡) =  𝛼𝛽 (4) 
From the relationship (4) we can estimate 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑗|𝑖𝛽,𝑡, but first we need to determine the two-
dimensional distribution 𝐹𝑡 of the rate of return vector (𝑟𝑗,𝑡, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡). This distribution can be 
represented using the copula in the following ways: 
 
 𝐹𝑡(𝑟𝑗,𝑡, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡) =  𝐶𝑡(𝐹(𝑟𝑗,𝑡), 𝐹(𝑟𝑖,𝑡)) (5) 
From formula (5) we can numerically calculate 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑗|𝑖𝛽,𝑡 by solving the equation: 
 
 𝐶𝑡(𝐹𝑡(𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅
𝑗|𝑖
𝛽,𝑡), 𝛼) =  𝛼𝛽 (6) 
Then, knowing the value of the measure 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑗|𝑖𝛽,𝑡, we can calculate the measure deltaCoVaR 
(∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛽
𝑗|𝑖
). The value of this measure is the difference between the value at risk of the 
insurance sector (institution j), provided that the insurer (institution i) is in a state of financial 
crisis and the value at risk of the insurance sector in the event that the financial standing of the 
entity i is normal (average), i.e. 
 
 ∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛽
𝑗|𝑖 = 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛽
𝑗|𝑋𝑖≤𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖𝛼 −  𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛽
𝑗|𝑋𝑖≤𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖
 (7) 
The value of this measure represents the contribution of the institution i to systemic risk. The 
lower this value, the greater the institution's share in generating systemic risk. 
 In our analysis we estimate the distributions 𝐹𝑡  of the vectors (𝑟𝑗,𝑡, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡) and determine 
𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖|𝑗𝛽,𝑡 using the two-dimensional copula-DCC-GARCH models with the t-Student 
copula. 
In these models, the average rate of return was modeled using the following ARIMA process: 
 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 (8) 
 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐸(𝑟𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1) (9) 
 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖,0 +  ∑ 𝜑𝑖𝑗𝑟𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=1
𝑝
𝑗=1  (10) 
 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = √ℎ𝑖,𝑡𝜀𝑖,𝑡, (11) 
Where Ω𝑡−1 denotes the collection of information available until the moment 𝑡 − 1, while 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
are independent random variables with identical distributions. We model the conditional 
variance h_ (i, t) using the exponential GARCH (eGARCH) model: 
 
 log(ℎ𝑖,𝑡) =  𝜔𝑖 + ∑ (𝛼𝑖𝑗𝜀𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛾𝑖𝑗(|𝜀𝑖,𝑡−𝑗| − 𝐸|𝜀𝑖,𝑡−𝑗|)) +
𝑝
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗 log(ℎ𝑖,𝑡−𝑗)
𝑞
𝑗=1  (12) 
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where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 =  
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
√ℎ𝑖,𝑡
 stands for the standardized rests. 
 To model the relationship between the rates of return we use Student's t-copula, whose 
parameters are the conditional correlations 𝑅𝑡, obtained using the DCC model (m, n): 
 
 𝐻𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡𝑅𝑡𝐷𝑡 (13) 
 𝐷𝑡 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(√ℎ1,𝑡, … , √ℎ𝑘,𝑡) (14) 
 𝑅𝑡 = (𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑄𝑡))
−
1
2𝑄𝑡(𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑄𝑡))
−
1
2 (15) 
 𝑄𝑡 = (1 − ∑ 𝑐𝑗 − ∑ 𝑑𝑗)?̅? + ∑ 𝑐𝑗
𝑚
𝑘=1 (𝜀𝑡−𝑗𝜀
′
𝑡−𝑗) + ∑ 𝑑𝑗𝑄𝑡−𝑗
𝑛
𝑘=1
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑚
𝑗=1   (16) 
?̅? is the unconditional covariance matrix for standardized remainders 𝜀𝑡, 𝑐𝑗,  𝑑𝑗, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑚 are 
scalar values, with 𝑐𝑗 describing the impact on current correlations of earlier shocks, and 
 𝑑𝑗,takes into account the impact on current correlations of earlier conditional correlations. 
 
 We estimate the parameters of the above copula-DCC-GARCH model using the inference 
function for margins (IFM) method. 
 
Data and results of empirical analysis 
 
The basis of the analysis are stock quotes of 28 European insurance institutions selected from 
among the 50 largest1. Five of them, AXA, Allianz,Prudential plc, Aviva, Aegon appear as 
systemically relevant on the current list of G-SIIs published by the FSB in 2016. We analyse 
weekly logarithmic rates of return from January 7th, 2005 to April 26th, 2019. 
Time series of topological network indicators, determined according to the first stage of the 
presented empirical strategy, are presented in Fig. 1 and 2. The first figure (Fig. 1) shows the 
average path length (APL), average maximum degree (Max.Degree) and estimated parameters 
𝛼 of the power distribution for minimum spanning trees from 07/01/2005 to 26/04/2019. The 
analysis of the charts shows that in the periods of June 2nd, 2006 - August 17th, 2007 and 
December 5th, 2008 - September 17th, 2010, APL decreases while Max.Degree increases, the 
α index is close to 2, which means that the network is shrinking and its structure is “scale-free”, 
that is, it takes a form in which there are few vertices with numerous edges (hubs) and many 
vertices with a low degree (betweenness centrality). In turn, Figure 2 shows BC for AXA, 
Allianz and Phoenix. The first two companies have the highest average values of this measure 
in the examined period (see Fig. 3), while the third one (Phoenix) is one of the five insurers for 
which BC is equal to zero in each of the examined weeks. Considering the fact that BC is an 
indicator on the basis of which we assess the importance of a given insurer in the context of the 
possibility of risk contagion, we note that the time series for these companies are 
“complementary” behaving graphs. During the entire analysed period, if BC for AXA increases, 
BC for Allianz decreases and vice versa. If BC for AXA remains stable, the BC level for Allianz 
does not change either. Figure 3 shows that in the subprime crisis state the French AXA 
company was clearly the dominant one on the European insurance market, while the German 
Allianz took over during the phase of excessive public debt. 
 
                                                          
1 We have chosen from among the 50 largest companies according to https://www.relbanks.com/top-insurance-
companies/europe all those that were listed in the period studied, namely: AXA, Allianz, Prudential plc, Legal 
& General, Generali, Aviva, Aegon, CNP Assurances, Zurich Insurance, Munich Re, Old Mutual, Swiss Life, 
Chubb Ltd, Ageas, Phoenix, Unipol Gruppo, Mapfre, Hannover Re, Storebrand, XL.Group, Helvetia Holding, 
Vienna Insurance, SCOR SE, Mediolanum, Sampo Oyj, RSA Insurance Group, Società Cattolica di Assicurazione, 
Topdanmark A/S. 
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Fig.1 . Average distances (APL), maximum degrees (Max.Degree) and estimated parameters 𝛼 of power distribution α for 
minimum spanning trees in the period 07.01.2005 - 26.04.2019 
 
 
Source: Own study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               A DYNAMIC MST- deltaCoVar MODEL OF SYSTEMIC RISK IN THE EUROPEAN 
INSURANCE SECTOR. 
7 
 
 
Fig. 2. BC for selected insurance institutions (AXA, Allianz and Phoenix) during the period 07.01.2005 - 
26.04.2019 
 
 
Source: Own study 
 
Fig. 3 BC distribution for AXA and Allianz in the normal state of the market (N), during the subprime mortgage 
crisis (SMC) and the public debt crisis (PDC) 
 
Source: Own study 
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We examine the relationship between the structure of the network of connections (MST) and 
the contribution to systemic risk based on time series deltaCoVaR measures, determined for 
individual insurers in accordance with the empirical strategy of the second step of the study. In 
each analysed period, we determine the deltaCoVaR measure for each insurer, assuming α = β 
= 0.05. Figure 4 shows the average BC and Figure 5 shows the average deltaCoVaR over the 
period under consideration for all 28 companies analysed. Comparison of these diagrams shows 
that BC and deltaCoVaR levels are related in extreme situations. In clear, for institutions with 
high BC, the deltaCoVaR value is the smallest, which means the largest contribution to systemic 
risk, for institutions with BC at zero level, the deltaCoVaR is the highest (i.e. the lowest 
contribution to systemic risk). So AXA and Allianz contribute to systemic risk to a much greater 
extent than Phoenix. Figure 6 shows how does the deltaCoVaR depend on the mean BC. It can 
be seen that with the increase of BC of insurer vertices, the deltaCoVaR decreases (the 
contribution to systemic risk increases). Figure 7 presents a summary of MST and a diagram of 
the deltaCoVaR dependence on BC in the period when all analysed companies have the smallest 
deltaCoVaR, which happens to coincide with the middle of the crisis, that is October 17th, 
2008. The tree during this period is such that AXA, Allianz and Aegon, having the largest BC 
and the largest contribution to systemic risk are directly related to each other. In Figure 8, we 
compile the contribution of AXA and Phoenix to system risk, i.e. the two companies that have 
the lowest and highest average deltaCoVaR, respectively. We observe the large differences 
between these companies in the determined market states: the normal one and two crisis states. 
 
Fig. 4. Average value of BC in the period under consideration for individual insurance institutions 
 
Source: Own study 
 
Fig. 5 The average deltaCoVaR value over the period under consideration for individual insurers. 
 
 
Source: Own study 
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Fig. 6 The relationship between the average BC and deltaCoVaR values over the period under consideration for 
individual insurers 
 
Source: Own study 
 
Fig. 7 MST and relationship between BC and deltaCoVaR in the period with the lowest deltaCoVaR for AXA 
and Allianz 
 
  
Source: Own study 
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Fig. 8 DeltaCoVaR for AXA and Phoenix in the period under consideration (left panel) and its distribution in the 
normal state of the market (N), during the subprime mortgage crisis (SMC) and the public debt crisis (PDC) 
(right panel) 
 
 
  
Source: Own study 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Analyzing the time series of topological APL, MD, BC indicators and the MST alpha indicator 
and the MST structure [citing work with Arxiva], we conclude that when the market is in a 
normal state, the series show volatility, but they do not have large amplitude. MSTs change 
their structure and the linkages between the companies is different depending on the time. We 
also note that to assess the potential risk of a rapid spread of the crisis, it is necessary to analyse 
all the four indicators. Indeed, with high correlation, the tree becomes very dispersed, which 
means that assessing the linkages only on the basis of the correlation coefficient could lead to 
erroneous conclusions. From the MST analysis, a clear shrinkage of the network can be seen in 
the periods of June 2nd, 2006 - August 17th, 2007, i.e. just before the subprime crisis and during 
its first phase, and in the period December 5th, 2008 - September 17th, 2010, i.e. before and at 
the beginning of the European public debt crisis. If MSTs are shrunk, it promotes potential 
propagation of financial problems. However, during the subprime crisis itself, the trees changed 
their appearance. They were relaxed: APL increased, MaxDegree decreased. 
 In this study, we analysed the 28 largest insurance companies from the point of view 
of the contribution of each institution to systemic risk in accordance with the currently used 
deltaCoVaR measure. The analysis of time series shows that for each of the companies in the 
period from 2005 to 2019 there is an obvious relation between its contribution to systemic risk 
and the structure of the network of connections (MST). The contribution of each company 
during the entire period remains at the same level, save for the clearly apparent period during 
which the deltaCoVaR delta decreases and, consequently, the contribution to the systemic risk 
increases, and this happens at the very center of the subprime crisis, October 17th, 2008. As the 
deltaCoVaR changes, the APL ratio increases. We should emphasize that for the entire analysed 
period, it reaches its maximum exactly on December 5th, 2008. 
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 The identified relationship between the contribution to systemic risk and the minimum 
spanning tree structure described by topological network indicators can be used in the 
construction of models whose task is to predict the possibility of systemic risk. The construction 
of this type of predictive models is the subject of further research by the authors. 
 
  
References 
Acharya, V. V., Pedersen, L. H., Philippon, T.,  Richardson, M. P. (2010), Measuring Systemic 
Risk, SSRN Electronic Journal, doi:10.2139/ssrn.1573171  
Adrian T., Brunnermeier M. (2011). Covar. Princeton University Working Paper] 
Baluch F., Mutenga S., & Parsons C. (2011) Insurance, Systemic Risk and the Financial 
Crisis, “The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice”, Vol. 36(1), s. 
126-163. doi:10.1057/gpp.2010.40  
Bedanrczyk T. (2013), Czy sektor ubezpieczeniowy kreuje ryzyko systemowe?, „Studia 
Oeconomica Posnaniensia”, Vol. 11 (260), s. 7-17 
Bell M., Keller B., (2009), Insurance and Stability: The Reform of Insurance Regulation, Zurich 
Financial Services Group Working Paper. 
Bierth C., Irresberger F., Weiß G. N. (2015). Systemic risk of insurers around the globe. 
“Journal of Banking & Finance”, 55, 232-245. doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2015.02.014 
Billio M., Getmansky M., Lo A. W., Pelizzon L. (2012), Econometric measures of 
connectedness and systemic risk in the finance and insurance sectors, “Journal of Financial 
Economics”, Vol. 104(3), s. 535-559, doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.12.010 
Chen H., Cummins J. D., Viswanathan K. S., Weiss M. A. (2013), Systemic Risk and the 
Interconnectedness Between Banks and Insurers: An Econometric Analysis, “Journal of Risk 
and Insurance”, Vol. 81(3), s. 623-652. doi:10.1111/j.1539-6975.2012.01503.x 
Cummins J. D., & Weiss M. A. (2014), Systemic Risk and The U.S. Insurance Sector, “Journal 
of Risk and Insurance”, Vol.  81(3), s. 489-528. doi:10.1111/jori.12039 
Czerwińska T. (2014), Systemic risk in the insurance sector, „Problemy Zarzadzania”, Vol. 
12(48), s. 41-63. doi:10.7172/1644-9584.48.3 
Geneva Association, (2010), Systemic risk in insurance: an analysis of insurance and financial 
stability, Technical report, Special Report of The Geneva Association Systemic Risk 
Working Group, Switzerland 
Harrington S. E. (2009), The Financial Crisis, Systemic Risk, and the Future of Insurance 
Regulation, “Journal of Risk and Insurance”, Vol.  76(4), s. 785-819. doi:10.1111/j.1539-
6975.2009.01330.x 
IAIS, (2013) Global Systemically Important Insurers: Final Initial Assessment Methodology, 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors,   July 18, Bank for International 
Settlements, Basel. 
Johnson N. F., McDonald M., Suleman M., Williams S., Howison S., (2005), What     shakes 
the FX tree? understanding currency dominance, dependence, and dynamics (keynote 
address),  SPIE Third International Symposium on Fluctuations and Noise, International 
Society for Optics and Photonics, pp.86–99. 
Mantegna R. N., (1999),  Hierarchical structure in financial markets, “The European Physical 
Journal B-Condensed Matter and Complex Systems”, Vol. 11, s. 193–197. 
Mantegna R. N., Stanley H. E., (1999), Introduction to econophysics: correlations and 
complexity in finance, Cambridge university press.  
Marti G., Nielsen, F., Bińkowski M., and Donnat P. (2017). A review of two decades of 
correlations, hierarchies, networks and clustering in financial markets. arXiv preprint 
arXiv:1703.00485 
Anna Denkowska and Stanisław Wanat 
12 
 
 Matesanz D., Ortega G. J., (2015) Sovereign public debt crisis in Europe. a network analysis, 
“Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications” Vol.436, s. 756–766. 
Nelson  D. B., [1991], Conditional Heteroskedasticity in Asset Returns: A New Approach, 
Econometrica, Vol. 59, s. 347–370 
Onnela J. P., Chakraborti A., Kaski K., Kertesz J. (2003) Dynamic asset trees and black 
Monday. “Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications” Vol. 324  s. 247–252. 
Onnela J. P., Chakraborti A., Kaski K., Kertesz J., Kanto A. (2003), Dynamics of market 
correlations: Taxonomy and portfolio analysis. “Physical Review E”Vol.68 (056110). 
Onnela J. P., Chakraborti A., Kaski K., Kertesz J. (2002), Dynamic asset trees and portfolio 
analysis,  “The European Physical Journal B-Condensed Matter and Complex Systems”, 
Vol. 30, s. 285–288. 
Sensoy A., Tabak B. M. (2014) Dynamic spanning trees in stock market networks: The case of 
Asia-Pacific, “Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications” Vol. 414  s. 387–402. 
Tang Y., Xiong J. J., Jia Z.Y., Zhang Y.C. (2018), Complexities in financial network 
topological dynamics: Modeling of emerging and developed stock markets, „Complexity” 
Vol. 2018, article ID 4680140. 
Weiß G. N., Mühlnickel J. (2014), Why do some insurers become systemically relevant?. 
“Journal of Financial Stability”, Vol. 13, s. 95-117. 
Wanat S., Denkowska A. (2018), Measuring systemic risk in the European insurance sector 
using copula-DCC-GARCH model and selected clustering methods. Conference 
Proceedings, 36th International Conference Mathematical Methods in Economics,  
Jindřichův Hradec, September 12-14, 2018, Faculty of Mathematics and Physics Charles 
University, Praha, ISBN: 978-80-7378-371-6, s. 630-635 
Wanat S., Denkowska A. (2019),  Linkages and systemic risk in the European insurance sector: 
Some new evidence based on dynamic spanning trees, arXiv:1908.01142. 
William K. Sjostrum, Jr.(2009),The AIG Bailout, 66 Wash. & LeeL. Rev. 943 
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol66/iss3/2 
 
 
 
  
 
